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Abstract
Three  models  representing  different  relations  between  intellectual  ability, 
metacognitive  skills,  and  learning  were  compared.  The  conditions  under 
which  each  of  these  models  holds  were  investigated,  on  the  basis  of  the 
threshold  of  problematicity  theory  (Elshout,  1987).  Novice  and  advanced 
learners  (N =  44)  passed through a  computer-simulated  inductive-learning 
environment of  different  complexity levels.  Results  show that  correlational 
patterns between intellectual ability, metacognitive skilfulness, and learning 
outcomes of novice learners at the easy level were similar to the patterns of 
advanced learners at the intermediate level. Metacognitive skilfulness rather 
than intellectual ability appears essential for learning when learners operate at 
the boundary of their knowledge. 
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The Impact of Intellectual Ability and Metacognition on Learning:
New Support for the Threshold of Problematicity Theory
1. Introduction  
Intellectual  ability  and  metacognition  are  two  important  determinants  for 
learning (Veenman, 1993).  Intellectual ability is regarded here as the acquired 
repertoire  of  general  cognitive  skills  that  is  available  to  a  person  at  a 
particular  point  of  time  (Humphreys,  1968;  Snow  &  Lohman,  1984).  As 
Anderson (1996,  p.  356)  phrased it,  “intelligence  is  the simple accrual  and 
tuning  of  many  small  units  of  knowledge  that  in  total  produce  complex 
cognition. The whole is no more than the sum of its parts, but it has a lot of 
parts.”  According to this view, performance on mental  ability tests  can be 
understood  in  terms  of  basic  information-processing  components  (Carroll, 
1993;  Simon,  1976;  Sternberg,  1988).  This  is  a  cognitive  approach  of 
understanding intelligence rather than the dominant psychometric approach. 
Whereas psychometric theories deal primarily with the structural aspects of 
intelligence,  cognitive  theories  deal  primarily  with  its  processing  parts 
(Sternberg, 1988). 
The concept of metacognition, first introduced by Flavell (1976), refers to 
both the knowledge about one’s own cognitive processes (i.e., metacognitive 
knowledge) and the regulation of these processes (i.e., metacognitive skills). 
Metacognitive knowledge concerns knowledge about the interplay between 
person characteristics,  task characteristics,  and the available  strategies  in  a 
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learning situation (Flavell, 1979), whereas metacognitive skills (i.e. executive 
skills;  see Kluwe,  1987) concern the self-regulatory activities actually being 
performed by a learner in order to structure the problem solving process. The 
assessment of metacognitive skills through self-reports is problematic because 
it appears that learners have poor insight into their own behaviour (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; Prins,  Busato,  Elshout,  & Hamaker,  1998; Veenman, Prins,  & 
Verheij,  2003). A valid but time-consuming method to assess metacognitive 
skills is the use of think-aloud protocols (Brown, 1987; Garner & Alexander, 
1989;  Veenman,  1993,  2005;  Veenman, Elshout,  & Groen,  1993).  The think-
aloud method taps processes in working memory (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), 
which means that automatic problem solving processes cannot be measured 
by  this  method.  Thus,  the  think-aloud  method  is  suitable  to  assess 
metacognitive skills  of  novice as  well  as  advanced learners  as  long as the 
learning task is complex enough for learners to prevent their problem-solving 
activities from being executed automatically. Scores for metacognitive skills 
measured with the think-aloud method are strongly related to metacognitive 
skills  measured  through  observational  data  (Veenman,  Kerseboom,  & 
Imthorn, 2000) or log-file data (Veenman, Wilhelm, & Beishuizen, 2004).  
For years now educational researchers have been discussing the relations 
between intellectual ability, metacognitive skills, and learning (e.g., Davidson, 
Deuser,  &  Sternberg,  1994;  Maqsud,  1997;  Sternberg,  1985,  1988,  1994; 
Swanson,  1990;  Veenman,  1993),  not  in  the  least  because  knowledge 
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concerning these relations is essential for the design of adequate instructional 
support.  There are reasons to consider metacognitive skills and intellectual 
ability as distinct concepts. First, metacognitive skills appear to be applicable 
over  a  wide  range  of  tasks  (cf.  Veenman  &  Verheij,  2003),  while  mental 
abilities,  such as verbal  ability and inductive reasoning, apply to a smaller 
range of tasks (Sternberg, 1988; Schraw, 1998). Second, evidence implies that 
the  frontal  lobes  of  the  brain  are  of  critical  importance  for  human 
metacognition  (Metcalfe,  1996;  Shimamura,  1996,  2000),  whereas  cognitive 
operations are also located in other areas of the brain (Kalat, 1992; Posner, 
Petersen, Fox & Raichle, 1988). Consequently, a person who has lost the most 
central metacognitive abilities because of brain damage “… appear to drift 
about like a rudderless ship”, even given a high level of cognitive abilities as 
measured by a variety of tests (Metcalfe, 1996, p. 404). Third, metacognitive 
skills are teachable and supportable (Brown & Palincsar, 1989; Schraw, 1998; 
Veenman, Elshout, & Busato, 1994), whereas a durable improvement of more 
specific cognitive abilities through training and support is rather difficult to 
achieve (Elshout, 1987).
Considering  metacognition  and  intellectual  ability  as  distinct  theoretical 
concepts does not imply that the two are unrelated. There are three models 
that  may represent  the relations  between intellectual  ability,  metacognitive 
skills, and novice learning (Veenman, 1993; Veenman et al., 2004), namely the 
intelligence model, the  independency model, and the  mixed model, each of which 
Threshold of problematicity theory  6
are described below. Some researchers (e.g. De Corte & Van Pelt, 2003) tend to 
focus  on  which  of  these  models  is  the  right  one.  In  contrast,  we  seek  to 
determine the conditions under which each of these models holds. Based on 
Elshout’s (1987)  threshold of problematicity theory,  which describes the varying 
impact of intellectual ability on learning due to task complexity, we suggest 
that task complexity is a key variable here. However, the theory still has two 
drawbacks.  First,  the  theory  does  not  explicitly  include  the  role  of 
metacognition.  Second,  the  empirical  evidence  for  the  threshold  of 
problematicity theory is limited as far as realistic learning tasks are concerned. 
Thus,  the  aims  of  the  present  study  are  to  extend  the  threshold  of 
problematicity theory to the role of metacognition, and to provide empirical 
evidence for the theory for learners in a realistic, ill-structured, self-directed 
learning task.
1.1 The relation between intellectual ability and metacognitive skills
The first model that represents the relations between intellectual ability, 
metacognitive skills, and novice learning is called the  intelligence model. This 
model  regards  metacognition  as  a  manifestation of  intellectual  ability.  For 
instance, Sternberg (1985, 1988, 1994) conceived metacomponents as an essential 
part of human intelligence. Metacomponents are used to decide what to do, to 
monitor ongoing activities,  and to evaluate  the outcome of  those activities 
after they have been completed and, thus, they are similar to metacognitive 
skills. In the same vein, the Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and Successive 
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(PASS)  theory of  intelligence  (e.g.,  Das,  Naglieri,  & Kirby,  1994)  conceives 
self-regulatory  processes  as  an  essential  part  of  human  intelligence.  The 
intelligence model  predicts  that metacognitive skills  and intellectual  ability 
are highly correlated and that metacognitive skills will not have a predictive 
value for learning independent of intellectual ability. Empirical support for 
the intelligence model was partly found by Elshout and Veenman (1992).
The  second model,  referred to  as  the  independency model,  predicts  the 
opposite.  Metacognitive  skills  and  intellectual  ability  are  not  substantially 
correlated  and,  thus,  they  are  independent  determinants  of  learning.  For 
instance, Allon, Gutkin, and Bruning (1994), Swanson (1990), Maqsud (1997), 
and Minnaert (1996) provided evidence for this model. In their studies, they 
found that metacognition and intellectual ability were unrelated predictors of 
learning. 
The last model, called the mixed model, predicts that metacognitive skills 
and intellectual ability share some variance but that metacognitive skills have 
a surplus  value  on top of  intellectual  ability  for  the prediction of  leaning. 
Evidence for the mixed model was, for instance, obtained by Berger and Reid 
(1989)  and  in  several  studies  by  Veenman  and  Elshout  (e.g.,  Veenman  & 
Elshout,  1995,  1999;  Veenman,  Elshout,  &  Meijer,  1997).  For  a  detailed 
overview concerning the evidence  for  the models,  see Veenman,  Wilhelm, 
and Beishuizen (2004) and Veenman and Spaans (2005).
1.2 Threshold of problematicity
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The threshold of problematicity theory (Elshout, 1987) and the mechanisms that 
form the base of  this  theory may provide insight into  when and why the 
relations between intellectual  ability,  metacognition and learning outcomes 
change.  This  theory  describes  a  varying  impact  of  intellectual  ability  on 
learning outcomes, depending on the task complexity. At a very low and at a 
very  high  level  of  task  complexity,  the  impact  of  intellectual  ability  on 
learning  outcomes  tends  to  be  zero.  Somewhere  in  between,  at  an 
intermediate  level  of  task  complexity,  intellectual  ability  has  maximum 
impact  on  learning  outcomes.  Due  to  the  differences  in  domain-specific 
knowledge,  a  particular  learning  task  is  experienced as  less  complex  by 
advanced  learners  relative  to  novice  learners  (Elshout,  1987;  Snow,  1989). 
Therefore,  the  curves  for  novices  and  advanced  learners  will  likely  have 




The low or  zero  correlations  between intellectual  ability  and learning 
outcomes at either end of the curve could be caused by a lack of variance in 
learning outcomes. However, in several empirical studies variance in learning 
outcomes at both ends of the curve was found, while intellectual ability still 
had little impact (Raaheim, 1988, 1991; Veenman & Elshout, 1999; Veenman & 
Verheij, 2003). Thus, there must be at least another determinant that causes 
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the  variance  of  learning  outcomes.  Elshout  (1987)  argued  that  for  every 
person there is a critical point on the task complexity continuum, which he 
called  the  threshold  of  problematicity.  Below this  threshold,  that  is,  for  easy 
tasks,  smooth,  internalised,  and  fast  problem-solving  activities  may  be 
observed.  The flow of activity is  relatively automatic and algorithmic,  and 
errors  mostly  come  from  cognitive  slips  rather  than  fundamental 
inadequacies  of  the  learner.  Above  the  threshold,  that  is,  during  more 
complex  tasks,  task-specific  or  domain-specific  knowledge  becomes 
increasingly inadequate. When no problem-solving strategy is available from 
memory, the learner must operate in a heuristic, improvisational mode (e.g., 
Anzai, 1991) and will shift to processes aimed at assembling a strategy. Snow 
(1989), for that reason, labelled the threshold of problematicity the algorithmic-
heuristic threshold. To be able to improvise or behave heuristically, one has to 
design  one’s  own  behaviour,  which  is  a  manifestation  of  metacognition 
(Elshout, 1987).
Strictly speaking, the threshold of problematicity theory just predicts the 
varying relation between intellectual ability and learning outcomes, and does 
not  involve  metacognition.  Nevertheless,  the  role  of  metacognition  can  be 
inferred from the mechanisms described in the threshold of problematicity 
theory. It is hypothesised that at the right end of the curve, that is, when tasks 
are very complex, the quality of metacognitive skills rather than intellectual 
ability is the main determinant of learning outcomes, because learners have to 
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improvise  and  use  heuristics  rather  than  call  upon  knowledge  and  skill 
components  that  are  associated  with  intellectual  ability.  They  need  to 
orientate, work systematically, and evaluate their behaviour to get the initial 
learning process on the right track (Veenman, Prins, & Elshout, 2002). This 
implies a low correlation between intellectual ability and metacognitive skills. 
Later on during the learning process, as learners become more experienced, 
learning  may  require  the  cognitive  sub-tasks  associated  with  intellectual 
ability,  which  have  to  be  regulated.  Thus,  the  threshold  of  problematicity 
theory  suggests  that  the  mixed  model  holds  for  situations  of  an  average 
complexity, that is, for a reduced but substantial zone of problematicity.
Empirical evidence for the (‘pure’) threshold of problematicity theory exists. 
Raaheim (1988, 1991), for instance, found a part of the hypothesised curve by 
using  a  longitudinal  design  in  which  students  were  required  to  solve  a 
particular task several times. Results showed that the impact of intellectual 
ability gradually increased.  Veenman et al.  (2002) found that in a complex 
computer-simulated learning environment, intellectual ability had hardly any 
impact  on learning outcomes of  novices  whereas  metacognitive skilfulness 
was the main determinant of novice learning outcomes. Finally, the general 
finding  that  intellectual  ability  is  either  unrelated  or  weakly  related  to 
performance of experts in several domains (Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Ericsson 
& Lehman,  1996)  is  consistent  with  Elshout’s  (1987)  theory.  The  empirical 
evidence, however,  is limited and mainly focussed on the relation between 
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intellectual  ability  and  learning  outcomes.  In  order  to  provide  additional 
empirical evidence for the threshold of problematicity theory, with respect to 
intelligence  as  well  as  metacognitive  skilfulness,  a  computer-simulated 
inductive-learning task with varying levels of complexity was developed. 
1.3 Inductive learning
Inductive-learning  tasks  require  active,  self-directed  learning.  They  fit  in 
current  constructivist  view  of  education  and,  probably  for  that  reason, 
nowadays  these  task  types  are  frequently  used  in  secondary  and  higher 
education (De Jong & Van Joolingen, 1998). In computer-simulated inductive-
learning environments, learners can design experiments by changing values 
of  input  variables  and  observe  the  resulting  changes  in  values  of  output 
variables. By carrying out experiments,  relations between input and output 
variables can be induced (De Jong & Van Joolingen, 1998). Thus, this kind of 
learning is labelled inductive learning (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagard, 
1986).  Inductive  learning  is  a  problem-solving  process  that  can  be 
characterized as a search process (Klahr, 2000; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Klahr & 
Simon, 1999). According to the framework of Klahr and Dunbar (1988), called 
scientific  discovery  as  dual  search  (SDDS),  learners  can search  in  two search 
spaces:  (1)  the hypothesis  space that  consists  of  possible  rules  that  can be 
induced in the learning environment, and (2) the experiment space consisting 
of all possible experiments that can be conducted in the learning environment. 
Klahr (2000) suggested that advanced learners and experts tend to search the 
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hypothesis space first, and that novices tend to search the experiment space. 
Indeed,  in  complex  learning  environments,  novice  learners  have  limited 
knowledge about relevant variables and, therefore, they are particularly busy 
conducting  experiments  in  order  to  identify  independent  and  dependent 
variables  before  they  can  generate  hypotheses  (Van  Joolingen  & De  Jong, 
1997;  Veenman  et  al.,  2002).  When  task  complexity  increases,  advanced 
learners may also reach a point at which their prior knowledge is insufficient 
and at which they have to rely on weak methods for problem solving. At that 
point  an  inductive-learning  process  similar  to  that  of  novices  may  be 
observed.
1.4 Research questions
To obtain support for the threshold of problematicity theory, the patterns of 
correlations  between  metacognitive  skilfulness,  intellectual  ability,  and 
learning outcomes will be examined for novices and advanced learners for 
three levels of task complexity. More specifically, the  unique contribution of 
intellectual ability and the unique contribution of metacognitive skilfulness to 
the  variance  in  learning  outcomes  will  be  determined,  as  well  as  the 
contribution  shared by intellectual ability and metacognitive skilfulness. The 
theory predicts that for tasks that are experienced as complex and unfamiliar, 
the learning process  will  be  a  heuristic,  improvisational  assembly  process. 
Hence,  learning  outcomes  for  novices  are  probably  associated  with 
metacognitive skilfulness rather than with intellectual ability, and thus, the 
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main  part  of  the  variance  in  learning  outcomes  will  be  accounted  for  by 
metacognitive skilfulness.
The threshold of problematicity of advanced learners may be positioned 
at a higher level of complexity (see Figure 1). When advanced learners reach 
their  boundary  of  knowledge,  that  is,  at  the  most  complex  level  of  task 
complexity,  it  is  expected  that  metacognitive  skilfulness  rather  than 
intellectual ability will have substantial impact on learning outcomes. At the 
intermediate level, we expect a pattern in which both determinants contribute 
uniquely to the variance of learning outcomes. At the relative easy level of 
task complexity,  it  is  hypothesized that  prior  knowledge will  be  the main 
determinant of learning outcomes because advanced learners may retrieve the 
knowledge  that  is  necessary  to  complete  the  majority  of  the  post-test 
questions directly  from memory. In sum, it  is  expected that  the pattern of 
correlations  between  metacognitive  skilfulness,  intellectual  ability,  and 
learning outcomes of novice learners at the easy level will be similar to the 
pattern of correlations of advanced learners at the most complex level. 
2. Method  
2.1. Participants  
Three  months  prior  to  this  study  the  intellectual  ability  of  496  first  year 
psychology students was assessed by a series of paper-and-pencil ability tests, 
representing  five  primary  intelligence  factors  (Inductive  reasoning, 
Quantitative  reasoning,  Verbal  ability,  Closure  flexibility,  and  Sequential 
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reasoning) in Carroll’s  re-analyses of factor-analytic  studies (Carroll,  1993). 
The test battery included tests for Vocabulary (difficult word meanings, 60 
items), Verbal Analogies (items taking the form of e.g. foe : hatred = friend : ...?,  
40 items), Conclusions (linear syllogisms, 40 items), Number Series (requiring 
the  completion  of  numerical  series,  30  items),  Number  Speed  (arithmetic 
problems of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, 90 items), and 
Embedded  Figures  (discrimination  of  figures  in  complex  line-patterns,  32 
items). According to Sternberg (1982), verbal analogies, linear syllogisms, and 
number series are tests to measure reasoning skills, which are an important 
subset of intelligence. The unweighted mean of the z-scores on these six tests 
may  be  regarded  as  a  measure  of  intellectual  ability  or  an  IQ equivalent 
(Veenman & Elshout, 1999). Those students, whose intellectual ability scores 
deviated at least 0.80 standard deviation from the mean, were classified as 
either being of high or relatively low intellectual ability. 
If participants had received physics education for three or fewer years of 
their six years of secondary education, they were classified as novice learners, 
whereas they were classified as advanced learners if they had received four 
years  or  more  physics  education.  Thus,  differences  between  novice  and 
advanced learners concerned their domain knowledge, not their experiences 
with computer-supported learning environments.  Participants  in this study 
were 44 first-year psychology students (10 relatively low intellectual ability 
novices,  12  high  intellectual  ability  novices,  13  relatively  low  intellectual 
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ability advanced learners, and 9 high intellectual ability advanced learners). 
The  groups  did  not  differ  in  sex  or  age.  The  participants  received  study 




2.2. Computer-simulated learning environment (the Optics Lab)  
In the present study a computer-simulated learning environment was used in 
the  optics  domain.  In  the  Optics  Lab  learners  could  run  experiments  by 
manipulating  light  rays  and  lenses.  Figure  2  depicts  an  example  of  an 
experiment in the Optics Lab. Learners could manipulate objects qualitatively 
by dragging them and quantitatively by changing the input of numbers. The 
distances between objects  and the angles  of  light rays could be measured. 
Light  rays  were  not  visible  during  the  movement  of  an  object,  so  each 
situation after a movement of an object was considered as an observation, and 
therefore, as an experiment. Experiments could only be run with one lens at a 
time. The tasks in the Optics Lab consisted of three phases. Phase 1 dealt with 
refraction.  In  this  phase  participants  could  run  experiments  with  four 
differently  shaped lenses  and one light  source  that  had one  light  ray  and 
could only be moved horizontally. Phase 2 dealt with focal distances of lenses. 
In this phase three thin lenses were available as well as one light source of 
three  parallel  light  rays  that  could  be  moved  horizontally  and  vertically. 
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Phase 3 dealt with images and magnification. In this phase one light source of 
three divergent light rays could be moved horizontally and vertically, and the 
same three thin lenses of phase 2 were available.
In  each  phase  learners  were  asked  to  infer  rules  about  optics.  For 
instance,  the  assignment  in  phase  1  was:  Try  to  find  out,  by  conducting  
experiments, what will happen when a light ray passes through a lens. When does the  
emerging light  ray intersect  with  the  axis  and what  determines  the  place  of  this  
intersection point? What are the differences between the four lenses? Learners could 
decide how much time they would spent working on this assignment before 
going to the next phase and the next assignment. Each phase started with the 
presentation of prerequisite theory concerning that phase. In phases 2 and 3 
the rules that could have been inferred in the previous phase were added to 
the theory, in order to reduce differences in prior knowledge associated with 
earlier phases. 
The rules  that  could be inferred in phase 2 were relatively easy.  The 
relations between variables were linear, and half of the independent variables 
had no effect on the dependent variable. Phases 1 and 3 were more complex 
because  of  the  more  complex  relations  between  system  variables.  These 
relations were non-linear and contained constraints.  An example of such a 
relation is: If the light source is positioned very closely to a positive lens, then 
the emerging light ray will not intersect with the optical axis. Phase 3 was 
assumed to be more complex than phase 1, because in phase 3 there were 
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more independent system variables and, therefore, more rules to be inferred. 
Although phase 1 is considered to be more complex than phase 2, learners 
started with phase 1 because refraction and positive and negative lenses are 
prerequisite concepts for understanding focal distance. Therefore, phase 1 will 
be labelled as the intermediate phase, phase 2 as the easy phase, and phase 3 as 
the complex phase of the Optics Lab.
2.3. Procedure  
All participants passed through the Optics Lab in a single session. The session 
started with a standardised twenty-minute instruction on how to operate in 
the Optics Lab. Participants could familiarise themselves with the Optics Lab 
by executing a set of prescribed actions (e.g. moving a lens in a prescribed 
way). After the instruction participants completed an optics pre-test, covering 
phases 1–3. They worked in the Optics Lab, running experiments for the next 
90 minutes. Note taking was possible, using paper and pencil. Each phase of 
the Optics Lab ended with a post-test, which was a parallel version of the pre-
test. Notes could not be consulted during completion of the tests. After a time 
limit of one and a half hour, participants had to stop experimenting but they 
were allowed to finish the post-test of the Optics Lab phase in which they 
were working.
Participants  were asked to think aloud during working in Optics Lab 
and during completion of the post-tests. Thinking aloud protocols were tape-
recorded,  transcribed,  time  tagged  and  analysed,  in  order  to  assess 
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metacognitive skills and to examine test-taking behaviour. The computer also 
logged  all  participants’  actions  in  the  Optics  Lab  in  order  to  compare 
metacognitive skilfulness with actual discovery behaviour. 
2.4 Metacognitive skilfulness.
The quality of metacognitive skills was assessed by judging the think-aloud 
protocols of the participants according to the criteria of Veenman and Elshout 
(Veenman,  1993;  Veenman  &  Elshout,  1991,  1995;  Veenman  et  al.,  1997). 
Metacognitive skilfulness was scored on four subscales: orientation activities, 
systematic  orderliness,  evaluation,  and  elaboration  activities.  Orientation 
activities concern the preparation for the task. These activities were judged on 
indications of analysing the problem statement, identifying the independent 
and dependent system variables,  building a mental model of the task, and 
generating  hypotheses  and  predictions.  Judgments  of  systematic  orderliness 
were based on the quality of planning activities, the systematic execution of 
those plans, completing an orderly sequence of actions, and the avoidance of 
unsystematic  events  (such  as  varying  two  variables  at  the  same  time). 
Evaluation activities  concern the control of the learning process.  They were 
judged on monitoring and checking,  both on the local level  (e.g.  detecting 
errors  and checking calculations) as well  as on the global level  of keeping 
track  of  progress  being  made  (e.g.  verifying  whether  the  results  obtained 
provide  an  answer  to  the  problem  statement).  Finally,  judgments  of 
elaboration concern  the  intention  of  storing  of  findings  and  concepts  in 
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memory.  They  were  based  on  indications  of  recapitulating,  drawing 
conclusions, relating these conclusions to the subject matter, and generating 
explanations. Elaboration itself may be conceived as a cognitive activity, but it 
is assumed that the occurrence of such cognitive activity at an appropriate 
point  in  time  results  from  metacognitive  activity.  In  order  to  avoid 
contamination  of  protocol  scores  with  learning  outcomes,  aspects  of 
metacognitive  skilfulness  were  judged  on  the  quality  of  performing 
regulatory activities, not on the correctness of the information that resulted 
from  these  activities.  For  instance,  generating  well-considered,  though 
incorrect predictions or incorrect conclusions may still result in high scores on 
orientation or elaboration.
The four subscales  of  metacognitive  skilfulness  were  rated  on a  five-
point scale, ranging from 0 to 4. For each participant summed scores over the 
four subscales were computed separately for the easy, the intermediate, and 
the complex phase, thus obtaining three scores for metacognitive skilfulness. 
The first author, who received no prior information about the participant’s 
scores of intellectual ability, judged the think-aloud protocols. In an earlier 
study (Veenman et al., 2002), the first two authors judged similar protocols 
obtained in Optics Lab according to the same criteria.  Average Cronbach’s 
alphas over the four different subscales of .93 were established as inter-judge 
reliabilities.
2.5 Learning outcomes.
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Pre-tests and post-tests consisted of three types of questions: (1) qualitative 
WHAT-IF questions, (2) qualitative reasoning questions, and (3) quantitative 
questions. WHAT-IF questions contained three parts: conditions, action, and 
predictions (Swaak & De Jong, 1996). In all questions conditions were defined 
by a depicted situation with a light source, light rays and a lens. Actions and 
predictions were presented in text. Actions referred to a change in the value of 
an independent variable, while predictions referred to the changed value of a 
dependent  variable.  The  learner  was  asked  to  decide  which  of  the  three 
predicted states would match the conditions and the action. An example of a 
WHAT-IF question:  The light source is moved a bit to the right. Where will the  
emerging light ray intersect? (1) Closer to the lens, (2) At the same distance from the  
lens,  or (3) Further away from the lens.  Qualitative reasoning questions were 
reversed WHAT-IF questions: A prediction was presented and learners had to 
choose  which  of  the  three  actions  would  match  the  conditions  and  the 
prediction.  An example  of  a  qualitative  reasoning  question:  When will  the  
emerging light rays intersect above the optical axis? (1) If you rotate the light rays  
upwards, (2) If you move the light source a bit downwards, (3) If you move the lens a  
bit to the right.  Quantitative questions also contained depicted situations, but 
in this case the answer categories concerned numbers. In the easy phase the 
quantitative  questions  of  the  post-test  dealt  with  the  focal  distance  of  the 
available lenses, which made them inappropriate for inclusion in a pre-test. In 
the complex phase the quantitative questions concerned magnification and 
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the  quantitative  relation  between  object  distance  and  image  distance.  The 
intermediate phase contained no quantitative questions because with a light 
source that has one light ray it is impossible to question magnification in a 
quantitative way.
All  independent  variables  in  the  Optics  Lab  were  systematically 
questioned with the WHAT-IF items, the qualitative reasoning questions and 
the  quantitative  questions.  The  pre-test  contained,  in  random  order,  14 
questions  concerning  the  easy  phase  (10  WHAT-IF  and  4  qualitative 
reasoning), 15 questions concerning the intermediate phase (10 WHAT-IF and 
5 qualitative reasoning), and 28 questions concerning the complex phase (18 
WHAT-IF, 3 qualitative reasoning, and 7 quantitative questions). The post-test 
questions were parallel versions of the pre-test questions, supplemented with 
3 quantitative questions concerning the easy phase. In the results section, the 
qualitative  questions  (WHAT-IF  and  the  qualitative  reasoning)  and  the 
quantitative questions will be reported separately.
3. Results  
3.1                        Analyses prerequisite  
Cronbach’s alphas of the qualitative pre-test of the easy, the intermediate, the 
complex phase and the total test were .65 (14 items), .04 (15 items), .30 (21 
items)  and  .55  (50  items),  respectively,  whereas  Cronbach’s  alphas  of  the 
qualitative post-test of the easy, the intermediate, the complex phase, and the 
total test were .48 (14 items), .59 (15 items), .53 (21 items) and .62 (50 items), 
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respectively.  Unfortunately,  reliability  coefficients  of  the  quantitative  tests 
were  insufficient.  Cronbach’s  alphas  of  the  quantitative  pre-test  of  the 
complex phase, the post-test of the easy phase, and the complex phase were .
01  (7  items),  .24  (3  items),  and  .21  (7  items),  respectively.  Thus,  results 
concerning the quantitative tests were excluded from further analyses.
Table 1 depicts the means and standard deviations of the Optics Lab pre-
test scores for relatively low and high intellectual ability novice and advanced 
learners. Pre-test scores are presented for each phase separately and for the 
total test. A MANOVA revealed main effects for level of expertise. Advanced 
learners outperformed novices on the Optics Lab qualitative pre-test of the 
easy phase,  F(1,40) = 5.44, p < .05, the complex phase,  F(1,40) = 11.75, p < .01, 
and the total pre-test,  F(1,40) = 15.63,  p  < .01. No main effect for intellectual 
ability,  F(3, 38) = 1.24,  p  = .31, and no interaction effect of level of expertise 
with intellectual ability for pre-test scores, F(4, 37) = 0.59, p = .68, were found.
Table 2 depicts  the means and standard deviations of  the Optics  Lab 
post-test scores for each phase separately and for the total test for relatively 
low and high intellectual ability novice and advanced learners. One-tailed t-
tests showed that novice learners gained qualitative knowledge from pre- to 
post-test in the easy phase, t(22) = 6.05, p < .01, the intermediate phase, t(22) = 
4.31, p < .01, and in the complex phase, t(21) = 2.73, p < .01. Consequently, their 
total  qualitative  post-test  score  was  significantly  higher  than  their  pre-test 
score,  t(21)  =  6.31,  p  <  .01.  The  advanced  learners  gained  qualitative 
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knowledge in the easy phase,  t(20) = 4.90,  p  < .01], the intermediate phase, 
t(20) = 2.35, p < .05, and the complex phase, t(18) = 1.77, p < .05, as well. Their 
total  qualitative  post-test  score  was  significantly  higher  than  their  pre-test 
score, t(18) = 5.02, p < .01.
As expected, the pre-test and post-test scores of the easy phase correlated 
significantly for advanced learners (r = .54, p < .05, n = 21), but not for novice 
learners  (r =  .11,  p =  .61,  n  =  23),  indicating  that  in  the  easy  phase  prior 
knowledge is an important determinant for learning for advanced learners. 
The  pre-test  and  post-test  scores  of  the  intermediate  phase  correlated 
significantly for novice learners (r = .49, p < .05) but not for advanced learners 
(r = .21, p = .37). Other correlations between pre-test and post-test scores were 
not significant.
A MANOVA with repeated measures indicated that the knowledge gain 
on the total qualitative test was significantly higher for novice learners than 
for advanced learners, F(1, 39) = 4.43, p < .05. The two groups differed on the 
pre-test, but not on the post-test. Furthermore, this MANOVA showed that 
the knowledge gain for high intellectual ability learners in the intermediate 
phase  was  larger  than  the  knowledge  gain  for  relatively  low  intellectual 
ability learners (Mlowpre = 5.36, SDlowpre = 1.76; Mhighpre = 5.82, SDhighpre = 1.89; Mlowpost 
= 6.36, SDlowpost = 2.08; Mhighpost = 8.55, SDhighpost = 2.82), F(1, 42) = 5.18, p < .05.
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3.2                        Metacognitive skilfulness and the relation with   
intellectual ability
A measure  for  metacognitive skilfulness,  consisting of  a  summed score  of 
orientation  activities,  systematic  orderliness,  evaluation,  and  elaboration 
activities, was assessed for each phase separately. The correlations between 
measures of metacognitive skilfulness of the easy phase and the intermediate 
phase (phase 2 and 1), the intermediate phase and the complex phase (phase 1 
and 3),  and the  easy phase  and the  complex  phase  (phase  2  and 3)  were 
respectively .40 (p < .01), .19 (p = .12), and .54 (p < .01). A principal component 
analysis on the measures of metacognitive skilfulness for the three phases of 
the Optics Lab extracted one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0. 
This  component  had  an  eigenvalue  of  1.76,  with  58.8%  of  the  variance 
accounted  for.  The  eigenvalue  of  the  second  component  was  0.83, 
representing an additional  27.5% of the variance.  In Table 3 the unrotated 
component matrix is depicted. All scores loaded high and positive on the first 
component.  Therefore,  the  results  concerning  the  overall  score  for 
metacognitive skilfulness,  that is,  the summed score over the measures for 
metacognitive  skilfulness  of  the  three  phases  of  the  Optics  Lab,  will  be 
reported below. The results  concerning the overall  score for metacognitive 
skilfulness  were  very  similar  to  the  results  concerning  the  measures  of 
metacognitive skilfulness of the three phase of the Optics Lab.
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Novice and advanced learners did not differ on overall  metacognitive 
skilfulness (Msumnov = 23.77, SDnov = 9.73; Msumadv = 19.89, SDadv = 10.03), t(39) 
=  1.26,  p  =  .22.  Furthermore,  no  difference  between  novice  and  advanced 
learners was found for intellectual ability scores (Mnov = 0.03, SDnov = 0.95; Madv 
=  –  0.06,  SDadv =  1.00,  respectively).  The  correlations  between  overall 
metacognitive skilfulness and intellectual ability were .54 (p < .01) for novice 
learners, and .60 (p < .01) for advanced learners. After correction for selection 
of extreme groups on intellectual ability (Gulliksen, 1961), these correlations 
became .39 and .44, respectively.
3.3                        Determinants of learning  
Table  4  shows  the  correlations  between  intellectual  ability  and  learning 
outcomes, and the correlations between overall metacognitive skilfulness and 
learning  outcomes.  Correlations  are  presented  for  novice  and  advanced 
learners separately for qualitative post-tests of each phase and for the total 
tests.  The  uncorrected  correlations  as  well  as  corrected  correlations  for 
selection of extreme groups on intellectual ability (Gulliksen, 1961) are shown. 
Inspection of the bivariate plots did not reveal a violation of the requirement 
of  homoskedasticity.  It  should  be  pointed out  that  correlations  for  indirect 
selection  (here  the  corrected  correlation  between  metacognitive  skilfulness 
and learning outcomes, see last column of Table 4) lack a statistical method 
for establishing a significance level. The significance of correlations for direct  
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selection (correlations with intellectual ability) is identical to the significance 
of the uncorrected correlations (Elshout, Overbeek, Roe, & Vijn, 1979). 
Table 5 depicts the distributions of the variance in learning outcomes of the 
three phases of the Optics Lab. Semipartial correlations (Nunnally, 1967) were 
calculated  by  partialing  intellectual  ability  from  the  correlations  between 
metacognitive  skilfulness  and  learning  outcomes,  and  vice  versa.  They 
represent  the  unique  contribution  of  intellectual  ability  and  the  unique 
contribution  of  metacognitive  skilfulness  to  the  variance  of  learning 
outcomes. The correlations in table 4 and the distributions in Table 5 show 
that metacognitive skilfulness is the main determinant of learning outcomes 
in the easy phase for novices, as expected. Moreover, for advanced learners, 
metacognitive skilfulness is the main determinant of learning outcomes in the 
intermediate  phase.  In  the  other  phases  the  unique  contributions  of  both 
intellectual ability and metacognitive skilfulness to the variance in learning 
outcomes is modest for both novice and advanced learners.
4. Discussion  
The aims of the present study were to extend the threshold of problematicity 
theory (Elshout, 1987) to the role of metacognition, and to provide empirical 
evidence for this theory for learners in a realistic, ill-structured, self-directed 
learning  task.  We  examined  whether  the  task  complexity  would  cause 
changes  in  the  patterns  of  correlation  between  intellectual  ability, 
metacognitive  skilfulness,  and  learning  outcomes,  as  the  threshold  of 
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problematicity  theory  suggests.  It  was  hypothesized  that  the  pattern  of 
correlations  between  intellectual,  ability,  metacognitive  skilfulness,  and 
learning outcomes would differ for novice and advanced learners. The pattern 
for novice learners in the relatively easy phase of the Optics Lab was expected 
to be similar to the pattern for advanced learners in the complex phase. 
As was expected,  the  pattern of correlations for novice and advanced 
learners differed substantially. For novice learners, metacognitive skilfulness 
was the main determinant for learning outcomes in the relative easy phase of 
the  Optics  Lab,  which  is  shown  by  the  size  of  unique  contribution  of 
metacognitive skilfulness to  the post-test  scores  of  the easy phase and the 
small  unique  contribution  of  intellectual  ability.  In  the  intermediate  and 
complex phase, the impact of metacognitive skilfulness and intellectual ability 
on learning outcomes was limited. Considering the relatively low impact of 
intellectual  ability on learning outcomes for novice learners,  even the easy 
phase of the Optics Lab may have been be positioned beyond their threshold 
of problematicity. 
For  advanced  learners,  in  contrast,  metacognitive  skilfulness  was  the 
main determinant in the  intermediate phase, and not, as we expected, in the 
complex phase. It is likely that, because of the complexity of the Optics Lab 
(see also Veenman et al., 2002), the advanced learners already reached their 
boundary  of  knowledge  in  the  intermediate  phase.  Thus,  the  pattern  of 
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correlations found for advanced learners in the intermediate phase resembled 
the pattern of correlations found for novice learners in the easy phase. 
These findings about the varying impact of metacognitive skills are in 
line with ideas of Weinert (1987), who stated that only for tasks of medium 
difficulty,  where  strategic  solutions  are  possible,  learning  behaviour  and 
performance  could  be  positively  influenced  by  metacognitive  skills.  On 
extremely difficult tasks, the use of metacognition may lead to the realisation 
that  further  effort  will  not  be  productive.  In  spite  of  the  rather  high 
complexity  of  the Optics  Lab,  novice learners  were  indeed able  to  acquire 
knowledge  in  the  Optics  Lab,  which  suggests  that  the  task  itself  was  not 
extremely difficult. In fact, the knowledge gain of novice learners was larger 
than  the  knowledge  gain  of  the  advanced  learners,  without  the  risk  of  a 
ceiling effect for advanced learners on the pre-test. The knowledge gains of 
novice learners were even large enough to let initial differences on the pre-
tests disappear on the post-tests.
Furthermore,  as expected,  for advanced learners prior knowledge was 
the main determinant for learning outcomes in the easy phase, shown by a 
high positive correlation between pre-test and post-test scores in that phase 
and the modest  correlations between intellectual  ability and metacognitive 
skilfulness at  the one hand, and post-test  scores on the other.  Apparently, 
advanced learners could retrieve the knowledge that is necessary to complete 
the  post-test  questions  directly  from  memory.  In  the  complex  phase,  a 
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marginal  significant  correlation  between  intellectual  ability  and  learning 
outcomes was found for advanced learners. These results are in accordance 
with the findings of Veenman and Elshout (1999).
In sum, the varying impact of intellectual ability on learning outcomes 
found in the present study is in accordance with the threshold theory, which 
states that the threshold of problematicity of advanced learners is positioned 
at  a  higher  level  of  the  objective  task  complexity  than  the  threshold  of 
problematicity  of  novice  learners.  Also  the  role  of  metacognition  is  in 
accordance with our theoretical view. In general, the patterns of correlations 
found  in  the  present  study  resemble  the  mixed  model (Veenman,  1993): 
metacognitive skilfulness and intellectual ability were related to some extent, 
while they both had an independent impact on qualitative learning outcomes 
at an adequate level of task complexity.
Reliability scores of the qualitative test were sufficient, except for some 
reliability  scores  of  the  qualitative  pre-tests.  This  could  cause  problems 
interpreting the correlations concerning these scores. Probably, low reliability 
was partly due to the complexity of the test items. When learners have limited 
knowledge, as is the case with novice learners, or when misconceptions are 
developed, inter-item correlations and, therefore, reliability will decrease.  It 
is well known that the internal consistency of novices in a pre-test is often 
low. Also the rather limited size of the tests and the fact that questions were 
multiple-choice items decreased test reliability. However, it should be noted 
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that  Cronbach’s  alpha  is  a  lower  bound measure  for  reliability  and,  thus, 
likely  underestimates  reliability.  For  this  reason,  correlations  concerning 
scales  with  moderate  reliability  could be higher  than one could expect  on 
account  of  Cronbach’s  alpha.  Moreover,  low  internal  consistency  is  a  big 
problem when results  are  not significant,  because  low internal  consistency 
would be the alternative explanation for a lack of significant results. When 
significant  results  are  found,  moderately  low internal  consistency  is  not  a 
pressing issue. Reliability scores of the quantitative tests, however, were too 
low, probably for the above-mentioned reasons, and results concerning the 
quantitative tests had to be excluded from further analyses.
When educators design learning environments and learning tasks, the 
threshold  of  problematicity  of  the  students  should  be  taken  into  account. 
Operating slightly above one’s threshold is the better way to learn (Elshout, 
1987;  Snow,  1989)  because  learners  are  then  challenged  to  extend  their 
heuristic and improvisational abilities. When learners operate too far beyond 
their threshold, the heuristic behaviour will be ineffective. Problem solving as 
well as learning will then become almost an impossible venture (see Weinert, 
1987). On the other hand, learners working far below their thresholds may 
only strengthen habitual automatic performance. Indeed, successful assembly 
processes will be strengthened and automatised by continued practice. They 
become, in Veenman’s (1993) terms, domain-specific task schemata, which are 
stored in memory, independently of the general task schema from which they 
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were derived. Instructional support, however, may be necessary to adapt the 
task complexity to the threshold of the learner. Eventually, continued practice 
will  gradually  raise a  learner’s  threshold of  problematicity  for  a  particular 
task:  More  and  more  difficult  instances  of  a  task  type  become  non-
problematical and automatic (Elshout, 1987). 
It will be a challenge for further research to try to move the threshold of 
problematicity of novice learners upwards by providing specific instructional 
support aimed at supporting their metacognitive skilfulness. Good examples 
of this kind of support  are structuring the environment by providing sub-
assignments and so-called  telling experiments (Veenman & Elshout, 1995), in 
which learners are explicitly told which experiments they have to conduct, 
leading to better learning performances. This kind of adaptive support may 
allow both high and low intelligent novice learners to turn more rapidly from 
generating hypotheses to data interpretation and testing hypotheses. 
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Table 1
Means and standard deviations of the qualitative pre-test scores in the different phases of the Optics Lab 
for novice and advanced learners with relatively low and high intellectual ability (IA)
PRE-TEST Low IA High IA Total
M SD n M SD n M SD n
Novice
Easy phase 6.50 2.01 10 7.23 2.62 13 6.91 2.35 23
Intermediate phase 5.00 1.76 10 5.46 2.22 13 5.26 2.00 23
Complex phase 6.80 1.55 10 8.85 2.34 13 7.96 2.25 23
Total 18.30 3.40 10 21.54 3.84 13 20.13 3.93 23
Advanced
Easy phase 8.92 3.03 12 8.67 3.04 9 8.81 2.96 21
Intermediate phase 5.67 1.78 12 6.33 1.22 9 5.95 1.56 21
Complex phase 9.92 2.15 12 10.33 2.65 9 10.10 2.32 21
Total 24.50 4.98 12 25.33 4.09 9 24.86 4.53 21
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Table 2
Means and standard deviations of the qualitative post-test scores in the different phases of the Optics 
Lab for novice and advanced learners with relatively low and high intellectual ability (IA)
POST-TEST Low IA High IA Total
M SD n M SD n M SD n
Novice
Easy phase 9.80 1.62 10 11.38 2.29 13 10.70 2.14 23
Intermediate phase 6.40 2.07 10 8.46 3.15 13 7.57 2.87 23
Complex phase 10.44 3.32 9 10.92 4.03 13 10.73 3.68 22
Total 26.89 3.98 9 30.77 6.66 13 29.18 5.93 22
Advanced
Easy phase 11.63 1.30 12 11.22 1.48 9 11.48 1.36 21
Intermediate phase 6.33 2.19 12 8.67 2.45 9 7.33 2.54 21
Complex phase 10.20 1.48 10 11.89 2.37 9 11.00 2.08 19
Total 28.50 3.44 10 31.78 3.23 9 30.05 3.66 19
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Table 3
Unrotated component matrix for measures of metacognitive skilfulness for three different phases of the 
Optics Lab
Component 1 Component 2
Easy phase .87 –.09
Intermediate phase .64 .74
Complex phase .77 –.51
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Table 4
Correlations between intellectual ability (IA), overall metacognitive skilfulness (MS) and post-test scores 
in the different phases of the Optics Lab for novice and advanced learners
Uncorrected Corrected
IA MS IA MS
Novice (n = 22)
Easy phase .36 .49* .24 .43
Intermediate phase .36 .37 .25 .29
Complex phase .08 .15 .05 .13
Total .35 .45* .24 .38
Advanced (n = 19)
Easy phase –.17 .11 –.11 .19
Intermediate phase .49* .72** .34* .67
Complex phase .45* .26 .31* .13
Total .52* .68** .37* .61
 Note. Corrected = corrected for selection of extreme groups of intellectual ability. 
 * p < .05. ** p < .01.
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Table 5
Proportion of the variance of post-test scores in the different phases of the Optics Lab accounted for by 
intellectual ability (IA) and metacognitive skilfulness (MS) for novice and advanced learners 
IA unique MS unique IA and MS Total
Novice (n = 22)
Easy phase .01 .13 .05 .19
Intermediate phase .02 .04 .04 .11
Complex phase .00 .01 .00 .02
Total .01 .10 .05 .15
Advanced (n = 19)
Easy phase .05 .07 .03 .15
Intermediate phase .00 .34 .11 .45
Complex phase .08 .00 .02 .10
Total .01 .25 .12 .38










Figure 1. The relation between task complexity and the impact of intellectual 
ability on learning outcomes.
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Figure 2. An example of an experiment in the Optics Lab.
